Iran: What would Reagan have done?

In a recent analysis for the Selous Foundation for Public Policy Research News & Analysis section Prof. Marek Jan Chodakiewicz demonstrates how the United States can successfully change the regime in Iran while avoiding the two extremes of idle diplomatic chatter, on the one hand, and costly war, on the other.

Smart Power Iran

We should make every effort to subvert and overthrow the government of Iran as non-violently and as indirectly as is humanly possible by both covert and overt actions.

SFPPR News & Analysis
Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
April 29, 2013

Iran plays smart. We do not – unless the objective is to stay engaged for engagement’s sake. That really worked neatly during the Cold War and we had the Soviets exactly where we wanted them: engaged. Thus, for most of the conflict we did not accomplish anything save for staying engaged. The fallacious assumption was that the impotent engagement saved us from a nuclear war, as if the Kremlin was incapable of nuking us at will while remaining engaged diplomatically pro forma. Had it wanted to attack us, it would have: engagement or not. Thus, engagement was a psychological prop for our own comfort, a device to soothe our own anxieties, but not a tool to deal with a mortal enemy. And then Ronald Reagan came along and changed the rules of the game. Reagan demonstrated clearly that engagement for engagement’s sake is insufficient to secure America’s strategic objectives. As John Lenczowski says, a symphony orchestra of statecraft must be deployed to achieve them.

What are our strategic objectives in Iran? Ostensibly, we want to prevent Teheran from going nuclear, which should be our plan minimum. A sovereign nation, however, has a right to develop its potential to the utmost, including nuclear capabilities. Concerns about nuclear proliferation are easily dismissed as a ploy by the mighty to control the weak. Look at Iraq. Had it had an A-bomb, the U.S. would not have invaded. A fission device helps keep bullies at bay. That is Iran’s propaganda line and it finds many a sympathetic ear, in the developing world and Western leftist circles in particular.

To continue reading please visit SFPPR News & Analysis.

The Tsarnaevs’ Moscow connection

The suspicious six-month trip of the elder Boston Terror Bomber, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, to Russia last year has raised many red flags. Primarily, the journey to post-Soviet Russia’s Islamist-ridden Northern Caucasus has generated questions about Moscow’s exact role in the Boston terror attack. What did the Russians know? Why did they not detain Tsarnaev, especially since they had given his name to the FBI?

Dr. Marek Jan Chodakiewicz seeks to answer these questions in an article for the Selous Foundation for Public Policy Research (SFPPR).

Boston Bombings: The Russian Question
SFPPR News & Analysis
By Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
May 8, 2013

It appears the Boston perpetrators, Tamerlan and his younger brother Johar (Dzhohar) Tsarnaev, were homegrown, Internet empowered jihadists. But Russia’s part in the deadly game remains murky. There is no solid evidence linking the Kremlin to the marathon bombing but too many questions remain unanswered to exclude Moscow’s involvement.

Let us consider the relationship between Tamerlan and the post-Communist secret police.

In 2011, Moscow approached Washington with a warning that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was involved in radical Islamist circles, most likely connected to the Chechen insurrection. Accordingly, the FBI talked five times to the young man and his relatives, but found nothing noteworthy. Now that we know the Russian warning about the older brother was eerily prescient we should ask on what basis the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) singled out Tamerlan Tsarnaev for the FBI’s investigation. But the Kremlin says it does not have anything specific on the perpetrator and never did. Why did Russia bother us then with investigating someone apparently lacking a track record of malfeasance? Yet it did.

To continue reading, please visit the SFPPR News & Analysis section.

Herb

Herb Romerstein has just passed away. He was very ill for a couple of years. Yet, not so long ago, after the Venona decrypts became, ahem, available to the public, he stood up at a conference and yelled at a detractor: “You traitor! You were a paid agent of Stalin.” Guilty as charged. A friend, a colleague, a mentor, a politically incorrect joker in residence, and a Red-hunter extraordinaire, Herb had a fire in his belly (to quote his wife, Pat) second to none. That simply means that he cared very much. By the way, when I say Herb, I should explain that I also mean Pat, Mrs. Romerstein. One did not exist without the other. They fulfilled and complemented each other. Period. It all started with a double blind date; they ditched their designated partners, fell in love, and never looked back. But I should stop stealing Professor Lee Edwards’s lines.

I will therefore stick to the Polish angle of Herb’s story. True, he was born in New York, but he was attuned to the world and cared about it a great deal as if his mother had had him somewhere in Warsaw. As a matter of fact, Herb used to say, his family was from “Poland.” More precisely, his grandfather was from Mir outside of Wilno (Vilnius, now in Lithuania) and Nowogródek (Navahrudak, now in Belarus). Incidentally, Herb knew that when his grandfather was born, Poland did not exist, having had been partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and Austria at the end of the 18th century. But his grandfather, who fled his domicile to America to avoid service in the army of the Tsar, taught him to refer to his place of birth as “Poland,” and to themselves as “Polish Jews,” and not Russian ones, or the Litvaks, God forbid. That is telling. His grandfather taught him to care about that place.

Herb thus had a tie to Poland from the very beginning, admittedly a tenuous one, which he would however strengthen as life went on. But first he became a Communist. Why? Well, in the 1930s, he lived in a German, Irish, and Italian neighborhood of New York City. The neighborhood kids loved Hitler. Why? The Irish hated the English, Rome was an ally of Berlin and shared some of its ideology. And the German attitude is self-explanatory, Herb would chuckle. Only the local Jewish kids opposed Nazi Germany. And some of them were drawn to the Communists who were the most vociferous in their denunciations of the Third Reich and itsFührer. Herb was one of them until his grandfather caught him, put him across his knee, and gave him a good drubbing.

The grandfather was a Bundist, a Jewish Marxist. I would make a face and wince; and Herb would explain: “Calm down. Being a Polish Jew and a Marxist from a party the Bolsheviks suppressed made him an anti-Communist. And it made me an anti-Communist. And it also taught me to appeal to the leftists to desist from swooning over Moscow.”  The Korean War drove that reality vividly home for Herb. From then on it was knives drawn against the reds. And Herb never forgot to fight the browns, either. He loved freedom. Hence, he hated both totalitarianisms.

During the war and after, Herb served in the military. And then he entered another kind of government service. Among other things, he worked for the House Committee on Anti-American activities. He hunted the red subversives abroad, in Europe mostly. At the height of the Cold War he boosted the Russian émigré trades unionists and other leftist alternatives to Communism. Later, he would neutralize the Communists, Soviet agents of influence, and a bevy of useful idiots in the Western European peace movement. He even defended, in deed and word, the Ukrainian nationalists from the KGB. Naturally, the intrepid Commie hunter supported Poland’s “Solidarity,” officially and unofficially. And throughout, he fought the Soviet lie of Katyn.

Last but not least, Herb penetrated into the bowels of the disintegrating Soviet empire, where at its very heart, in Moscow, he was buying up all he could on the archive market. Our professor knew his stuff. No one could dupe him, and the post-Soviets did attempt to peddle junk to him on many an occasion. Herb would sneer at them, while, to me and others, he would bemoan the imbecility of the CIA which was “not interested in history,” and was not supporting financially or otherwise such research ventures into the lands of the former Evil Empire. Still, he amassed a virtual treasure trove of documents, including on Polish affairs, which Herb generously shared with me. Most of them are at the Hoover now, thanks to the aquiline eye for archival treasure of Dr. Maciej Siekierski.

Aside from the gripes at the unbearable lightness of being of the bureaucrats in the intelligence community, Herb’s greatest pet peeve was the Hill. He stressed that most of the fighting of the Cold War took place in Congress. Without U.S. leftists, fellow travelers, agents of influence, progressive dupes, and others, the Cold War would have been won much earlier. Whenever he was back stateside, Herb would be stomping out the domestic-bred reds with a variety of outfits, including the New York Police Department. My favorite story, however, is about the browns. After Herb was done chasing the Commies in New York City, he was tasked with tackling the Ku Klux Klan in the area. Our bad guy hunter even tricked himself out in a spiffy KKK outfit. He duly infiltrated that nefarious organization. Alas, it turned out that out of seven people in the leadership six were either law enforcement or snitches.

But I digress. Well, not really. There’s a Polish story to the KKK, too. Herb loved to mentor young people. And he shared his crazy adventures with a few of them. Lest Professor J. Michael Waller reacts to this with his customary forgiveness and warmth, I am not going to talk about the appreciation of his own talents by Herb back in college, but, rather, I will focus on a few of our Polish interns. Two of them hit it off with Professor Romerstein in particular: our IWP doctoral fellow Piotr Gontarczyk, Ph.D., and Wojciech Jerzy Muszyński, who was a graduate student when he came to us, but has earned his Ph.D. since and is a brilliant historian. And so is Dr. Gontarczyk.

As far as Piotr, I asked Herb to elaborate for him on my stories of the anti-Communist Zionist-Revisionists that I had told the Polish kids (and written in my books), while mentoring them during my sojourn in Poland in the 1990s. In particular, I explained about the greatly neglected Jewish Military Union (Irgun Zwoi Leumi), whose fighters hoisted the Jewish and Polish flags during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of April 1943 to the great fury of the Germans. Herb took to the task with a gusto. Piotr returned to Poland and helped make a documentary on the Revisionists.  Their contributions have now been amply recognized not only on the Polish Right but also at the popular level. Kudos to Herb and Piotr.

And then there is Albert. Oh, my goodness. Mrs. Romerstein called Herb and Albert the Siamese twins. They were joined at the hip. They had similar facial expressions; they had similar interests; they were passionate about similar things. They rattled off anecdotes and historical minutia like machine guns: “No, this was the 27th and not the 28th Waffen-SS division.” “Absolutely, he was a major in the NKVD in the Gulag, but later he was reassigned to New York.” They knew their stuff.

Herb and Albert were inseparable. They should have gotten married. As Pat rolled her eyes, Herb and Albert scouted flea markets in the post-Soviet zone. “No, this is a fake ghetto police badge,” they would shout in unison to a black market vendor. They would pick up Nazi paraphernalia, or Communist trinkets. Both avid hoarders and fanatical collectors, they loved to share their loot, but only with themselves, sniffing suspiciously when anyone approached their stash. And they laughed heartily at everything, infecting everyone with their sick jokes. Together they donned bizarre historical uniforms, e.g., Stasi regalia. And the infamous duo never relented. Sick, sick, sick! We all loved their jokes.

Herb, of course, was forever the mentor to Albert. And he taught him his jokes. Here’s a small sample of politically incorrect Romersteinalia. “What is anti-Semitism in Hungary?” “Hating Jews excessively.” Or: A bunch of anti-Semites angrily corner Yitzhak Goldberg. “Who killed Christ?,” they demand. Goldberg responds: “I did not, but I have heard that it was Rosenzweig and I will gladly give you his address.”  Or: A Jewish kid to his dad: “Daddy, are we descended from apes?” Dad: “Maybe you are, bubbele, but not me.”

Herb knew what was right and wrong. He always came to my rescue whenever I was in trouble. He was intrepid. And the courage and the humor never ended.  And it never will, as we promise to carry on the way Herb would like us to.

Requiesce in pace, my friend. I can’t do kaddish, but I’ll give it my prayer.

Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
Washington, DC, 8 May 2013
http://www.iwp.edu

Please click here for a New York Times article about Herb Romerstein.

Marek, Herb, and Albert

Photo: Herb Romerstein, during one of his Polish trips, near Królewiec/Königsberg/Kaliningrad with a trophy acquired in the old USSR. Dr. C on the left, Albert to the right.

The Worst Enemy: A book review

The ongoing culture war in the West continues to hamper our efforts to defeat radical Islam. Such is the thesis of a recently published anthology, co-edited by Katherine C. Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo, which was reviewed by Dr. Marek Jan Chodakiewicz for the Selous Foundation for Public Policy Research (SFPPR).

Fighting the Ideological War does not limit itself to pointing out the self-inflicted obstacles to winning the ideological war with Jihadist extremism, however. Its contributors-including IWP’s Founder and President, Dr. John Lenczowski-also demonstrate how lessons learned from our victorious struggle against Communism may be applied successfully in the battle against Islamism.

Dr. Chodakiewicz’s review follows below:

The Worst Enemy

Katherine C. Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo, eds., Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from Communism Islamism (McLean, VA: The Westminster Institute and Isaack Publishing, 2012).

Reviewed by Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
April 26, 2013

We are the worst enemy of the West. Or, to put it a bit differently, the most serious adversary is born and bred within the gates of the West. Thus, the battle against mortal danger to our civilization ranges among the denizens of our cultural and political sphere and it must be won here before we can proceed to victory outside. This is a phenomenon which James Burnham called “Suicide of the West” as reflected in the inability of liberal intelligentsia to comprehend the evil of Communism. A neat illustration of the civil culture war can be the sustained leftist campaign of hatred and ostracism against Yale’s Professor G. Warren Nutter who, in the 1950s, dared to suggest that the Soviet economy was inefficient. He thus violated the obligatory Sovietophilia of America’s chattering classes and their socialist prejudices.

Now seven distinguished experts, including two who are my friends and colleagues, Brits and Yanks, demonstrate in Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from Communism to Islamism, how the culture war phenomenon has survived to cripple our response to the radical Muslim challenge. “The result is an unwillingness to engage in the battle of ideas and a widespread confusion, even doublespeak, in the way policymakers talk about Islam.” But take heart. The experts also show, plain and simple, how Communism was overcome and propose to apply the same strategy and tactics to Islamism. They give us trenchant definitions, vivid analysis, and bold solutions to lead us to victory.

To continue reading the review, please visit the SFPPR Book Review section.

Three years after the Smolensk Crash

Less than a month ago was the third anniversary of the tragic Smolensk Plane Crash, which was a great blow to our Polish ally within NATO. In a recent SFPPR News & Analysis article, Paweł Styrna summed up the many suspicious developments in the case that have continued to surface in the past three years, thereby demonstrating that the crash is by no means “yesterday’s news.”

Paweł Styrna is a student of international relations at The Institute of World Politics and a researcher and administrative assistant for the Kościuszko Chair of Polish Studies and the Institute. He is also a Eurasia analyst for SFPPR and has written and lectured on the Smolensk Plane Crash.

The views expressed in the article below are solely Mr. Styrna’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute of World Politics or the Kościuszko Chair of Polish Studies.

Smolensk: An inconvenient tragedy
Three years following the suspicious Smolensk Plane Crash new developments and evidence continue to surface.

SFPPR News & Analysis
By Paweł Piotr Styrna
April 22, 2013

The Smolensk Plane Crash claimed the lives of the President of Poland, his wife, and 94 other members of the country’s patriotic and pro-American political and military elite.

Three years have passed since the suspicious Smolensk Plane Crash of April 10, 2010. During this time, new developments in the case occurred and evidence continued to surface. Most disturbingly, these findings have anything but dispelled doubts about the veracity of the official, FSB/KGB-manufactured Moscow-Warsaw “pilot error” line. Instead, they have consistently pointed in the direction of foul play. Since the mainstream media and public opinion in the West do not appear to have been following these developments or registered the geopolitical significance of Smolensk, it seems appropriate to elaborate on some of the more recent findings. For brevity’s sake, this article will mention only developments which occurred after mid-2012, for I have focused on the background and previous discoveries in two SFPPR News & Analyses articles.

Cyber attacks on the Polish Foreign Ministry

To begin with, we have learned that two cyber attacks—one on April 6, 2010, and another on April 10, i.e. the very day of the crash—temporarily crippled the Polish Foreign Ministry. Its employees thus had no access to servers with secret information, not to mention email or even telephones. On the day of the tragedy, the cyber attack even prevented the Foreign Ministry from receiving a list of passengers via email. This was discussed, in a June 2012 interview, by retired CIA new technologies and aviation expert, S. Eugene Poteat, who argued that it was quite likely that the culprits were hackers working for the post-Soviet regime in Moscow. After all, Russian cyber attacks had also paralyzed Estonia and Georgia (before the August 2008 invasion). Poteat, a professor at the DC-based Institute of World Politics, conducted the initial investigation of the crash that questions Russia’s claim the crash was a case of mere pilot error, leading others around the world to take a second look.

To continue reading this article, please visit SFPPR News & Analysis.

Dr. Chodakiewicz reviews book on the Polish-American veteran experience

Dr. Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, the holder of the Kościuszko Chair of Polish Studies at IWP, has published a review of Teofil Lachowicz’s book on the Polish-American veteran experience in The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, April 2013: 357-360.

The review may be accessed via the JSTOR academic database or viewed as a PDF here: PAVA in Battle and Fraternity. The longer version can be found below:

PAVA in Battle and Fraternity

Teofil Lachowicz, Polish Freedom Fighters on American Soil: Polish Veterans in America from the Revolutionary War to 1939, trans. by Albert Juszczak (Minneapolis, MN: Two Harbors Press, 2011). It is a translation of Weterani polscy w Ameryce do 1939 roku (Warszawa: Rytm, 2000).

Anyone expecting an opus contextualizing, comparing, theorizing, and pondering the “Otherness” of Polish veterans in America should look elsewhere. Instead, Teofil Lachowicz has given us an indispensable, if hermetic almanac of the Polish ex-combatant experience in the United States. His Polish Freedom Fighters on American Soil is divided into two chronological parts: first, the period between the War for Independence and the First World War; second, the interwar years. Tellingly, given his Polish perspective, Lachowicz ends his monograph in 1939 rather than in 1941, the latter standard American periodization because of Pearl Harbor.

The first part of the narrative is based almost exclusively on secondary sources, some of them rather hard to find. The second part draws on a wealth of primary sources chiefly from a single, if exhaustive collection – that of the Polish Army Veterans Association of America (PAVA), Orchard Lake, MI, but also with some documents from the Piłsudski Institute in New York; the Hoover Institution at Stanford, CA; and the Archive of New Records in Warsaw. The monograph sadly fails to include any English language primary sources and hardly any non-Polish secondary ones. Its first part concerns veteran personalities; the second one describes an organization of the veterans.

To set up the story, the author briefly recounts the exploits of the likes of Tadeusz Kościuszko and Kazimierz Pułaski during the War for Independence and Włodzimierz Krzyżanowski and Kasper Tochman during the War Between the States. Many others, often obscure and forgotten, surface in the author’s chronological laundry list of personalities. Most get an honorary mention. A few merit a mini biography. Lachowicz also mentions here a number of Polonian organizations set up by the veterans of Poland’s martial catastrophes: the Confederacy of Bar (1768–1772); Kościuszko Insurrection (1794), Napoleonic Wars (1795-1815), November Rising (1830–1831), and January Rising (1863–1865).

The losers were virtually the first Poles on these shores since the Jamestown Polish crew in the early seventeenth century. Perhaps a few thousand Polish veterans had settled in the U.S. by the 1880s. Lachowicz’s numbers are regrettably scattered and inconclusive. Most of them came voluntarily, but several hundred were forcibly deported here by the Habsburg authorities in the mid-nineteenth century. Only a few returned to the Old Country, or, at least, Europe, to fight again or to retire at home. The remainder stayed behind and sampled the whole gamut of the American experience.

A few lucky ones did very well for themselves. Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, for example, married rich, which freed him from the mundane obligations of life. Józef Truskolaski enjoyed the patronage of James Fenimore Cooper who sponsored his engineering education. Chopin’s manager and friend Julian Fontana embarked on his own successful career as a composer and a concert pianist. Wawrzyniec Gębicki excelled at knife making and built up a successful company. Most impressively, Erazm Józef Jerzmianowski became a multi-millionaire through his own effort. Virtually all of the fortunate ones assisted generously their fellow Poles and the cause of Poland’s freedom.

Most ex-soldiers, however, had a tough time making it in America. They generally experienced indifference from federal and state authorities, who sometimes limited themselves to declarations of sympathy, exceptionally backed by political resolutions that, in theory, aimed at relieving the hardship of the Polish veterans but, in practice, failed to deliver, like the unrealistic congressional Ohio land grant project for the Poles of 1834.

The Polish encounters with the denizens of the United States usually reflected the latter’s utter ignorance of Poland and its plight. Public celebrations of high profile emigrants or guests were few and far between and lasted but fleetingly. The Poles could count only on a few Americans, WASPs from the highest echelons of the society, to advocate for them: for instance, Dr. Paul Fitzsimmons Eve, who fought in the November Rising, or Major Cedric Fauntleroy, who fought in the Polish-Bolshevik War.

On the other hand, why should the American people have catered to the Poles? Self-help was the American way. The former military men were usually ill-equipped to take advantage of America’s individualistic freedom. They found themselves at the bottom of the social ladder. They complained that the blacks enjoyed status superior to them because of their lack of command of the English language: “We are worse than the Negroes, under whom we work in domestic service situations.  We are placed under their supervision because they know the native language” (p. 15). The Poles performed the most menial jobs and suffered hunger and hardship: “aside from deepest desperation I feel like laughing when I recall Olszański, who keeps being pushed around now by the servants in the house, now by the Negroes. This one tells him to shine shoes, that one tells him to empty the urinals. Or when I see old Morawski removing rubble in a wheelbarrow out onto the street and then when I see the kids peeing in his wheelbarrow, or Komar carrying a huge pipe across town and behind him several hundred boys shouting Pole! Pole!” (p. 16). All this was hard to swallow for intrepid freedom fighters, many of whom were noblemen.

After a while, the veterans set up a number of organizations, most of them ephemeral, like the Polish Committee in New York. Some veterans were also active in setting up major fraternals, including the Polish National Alliance (PNA) and the Polish Roman Catholic Union of America (PRCUA), which eventually laid framework for the PAVA. But most ex-military Poles remained unorganized. Many intermarried with the locals and quickly assimilated, as there was a dearth of Polish women. A number wandered around the continent, settling as far west as California, for instance Korwin Piotrowski, the inspiration for Henryk Sienkiewicz’s Zagłoba.

The fate of the wanderers was checkered. Some experienced kindness from native Americans in Ohio in 1834; others died at the Indian hands, like the band of Polish ex-military brothers who left Louisiana for Texas in 1835; still others fought them, for example during the Seminole wars between 1834 and 1842. Overall, only a few Poles joined the U.S. military in the nineteenth century. The exception was the Civil War when the volunteering of the Polish warriors markedly increased. Yet, they fought in every American conflict and often paid the highest price, for example, the Petrussewicz brothers killed by Mexicans at Fort Goliad in 1836 or Gustaw Szulc who was hanged by the British following his participation in the ill-fated American military incursion into Canada in 1838.  The first casualty on the Confederate side was reportedly an American Pole: Tadeusz A. Strawiński, who died accidentally at Fort Moultrie, SC, on January 25, 1861.

Statistically, after 1863, Polish veterans were not representative of the American Polonia. Following the 1870s at the latest, most arrivals from Poland in the United States were economic migrants, mostly peasants. Military and political figures were exceptional. However, those peasants and their offspring (and here the author unfortunately fails to include any references to the superb work on Polish-American consciousness by Thaddeus and John Radziłowski) became Poles in America and, thus, about 20,000 of them, spurred by patriotism, resolved to fight for Poland during the Great War and its aftermath in the “Blue Army” under General Józef Haller. In addition, nearly 40,000 American Poles joined the U.S. armed forces to struggle for the same aim.

The freedom fighters of 1914–1921were inspired by the Polish veterans of 1830 and 1863 as well as by their patriotic priests. They were crucial against the Ukrainians and they contributed mightily to the victory against the Bolsheviks, even though Józef Piłsudski treated them rather shabbily throughout. This was in response to the solid support of the Polish Americans for Roman Dmowski and Ignacy Paderewski, which reflected not only their preference for nationalism over socialism but also, primarily, the logical embrace of the Entente over the Central Powers, which was in congruence with the war-time policy of the United States. The American Poles insisted on remaining patriots for both the U.S. and Poland.

Parenthetically, the blood of the “Blue Army” was not the only contribution of the Polonia to the cause of the Old Country’s freedom. “The Polish American community… gave Poland $5,939,419.34 from October 12, 1914 to December 31, 1920…. In this way the Polish American community realized its and its ancestors’ dreams and longings” (p. 96).  That is $68,878,094.79 in today’s U.S. money. The generosity is simply mind-boggling, particularly in light of recent history and contemporary times.

After the victory, most of the veterans returned home to America; a few stayed behind or re-emigrated afterwards. Although designated as “Americans” in Poland, and evacuated home by the White House in 1921, the soldiers of the “Blue Army” were denied veteran status in the United States. This was on spurious grounds that Poland had not yet existed as an allied state when they volunteered. Thus, they received no U.S. government help whatsoever. For example, unlike, say, the Belgian veterans resident in the U.S., the Polish ex-combatants had no right to federal health care. Never mind that they went into action as allied units in France already in 1917 and the political leadership of the “Blue Army” was uniformly recognized by the heads of the Entente, including President Woodrow Wilson, as a de facto Polish government. Having arrived back home, the Polish Americans had to fend for themselves and reestablish their lives after the military interlude on behalf of Poland. Most challenges were economic: how to re-integrate the former warriors into the civilian life during a severe post-war recession.

Neither America nor the Polonia was prepared for the influx of the “Blue Army” ex-combatants.  There was only one exception. “It ought to be noted that thanks to the provident care and the strong hand of Father [Lucjan] Bójnowski the Polonia in New Britain was the only Polish American center that was properly prepared for the return of its soldiers from war, in line with the assurances that had been given during recruitment for the Polish Army in France” (p. 122). In most places, the veterans had to fend for themselves.

To maintain the spirit of camaraderie from the trenches and to assist each other, the freedom fighters created the PAVA.  This was a fraternal par excellance. Its main objective was to look after the welfare of the members. Further, it participated in cultural, educational, and political events. That included speaking up in defense of Poland and America in print and deed: “to repel anti-U.S. and anti-Poland propaganda,” as their by-laws of 1937 reiterated. Accordingly, for example in October 1923 in Detroit the “Blue Army” veterans routed the rampant Communist and other leftist sympathizers who, while fomenting unrest and anarchy in an American city, first had besmirched the Old Country’s reputation in the press and then physically had lashed out at the Polish-American freedom fighters (p. 281).

Incidentally, although the PAVA members were Polish nationalists, they were not National Democrats. As Americans, they remained committed to parliamentary democracy and they felt much more comfortable with Haller’s Christian democracy than with Roman Dmowski’s emerging corporatist “Third Way.” For the same reason, the PAVA failed to embrace Piłsudskis coup’d etat. Yet, from the early 1930s, the Polish American veterans also endeavored to achieve reconciliation with the Piłsudskites. It was not only because the latter were in power and could dispense largesse from public coffers, but primarily because the followers of the Marshal represented the independent Polish State. And they were a military lot, which appealed to the PAVA much more readily than the civilians of the National Democracy. With the Nazi and Soviet danger looming menacingly, by 1939 the former Polish army soldiers in America stood squarely behind the Polish government.

Meanwhile, the erstwhile freedom fighters never forsook the mundane. The main function of the PAVA was self-aid, after all. Most of its funds, collected from the dues and generous contributions of supporters, most notably Ignacy Paderewski and some of the clergy (“among the larger donors the names of priests predominated” p. 193), went to sustain widows, orphans, war invalids, and down-on-their-luck veterans. Some of the accounts of their plight are truly harrowing. There were even several deaths by starvation and suicide among homeless veterans, for example Piotr Malinowski in 1922. The Great Depression caused more victims. “About 45 persons” died thus in the interwar period, all of them unaffiliated veterans (p. 190). In distinction, the PAVA took care of its members and often extended free membership to the needy who turned to the fellow freedom fighters for help. The PAVA Women’s Auxiliary Corps under Agnieszka Wisła distinguished itself enormously in this endeavor. Substantial subsidies went to the Polish American veterans who settled in Poland, including a few ill fated enterprises, most notably several economically unsustainable retirement houses and work farms in the Old Country (which, confiscated by the Nazis and Communists, should now be returned to the rightful owners).

Generally, in the interwar period, the PAVA played an important, albeit ancillary role in the Polonia. It was a relatively small outfit, roughly 4,500 members by 1939, as most veterans failed to enroll (p. 146). Also, the PAVA could not compete with more universal organizations like the PNA and the PRCU. However, there was a great deal of overlap with those and other Polish-American institutions, in particular the Falcons, which had been the main source of recruitment for the “Blue Army.” Rather than competing, the PAVA complemented others.

Teofil Lachowicz has unequivocally succeeded in demonstrating, even if it was not his intention, that the Polonia was at its most powerful in the United States before 1921, when it unabashedly invoked the greatness of the Commonwealth in general and the Polish armed struggle for freedom in particular as its universal source of inspiration; when it brazenly advertised its Polish ethnicity; when it sustained itself by its Christian religion; and, last but not least, when it drew leaders among the priests, businessmen, and professionals, and other practitioners, rather than intellectuals. Lachowicz has also shown that, inspired by the spirit of nationalism and camaraderie, the American Poles not only fought for Poland gallantly and greatly contributed to its resurrection, but they also were able to take care of their own with their own means when the victorious troops returned home. That is truly admirable and shines proudly throughout Teofil Lachowicz’s equally proud account of the efforts of the Polish American freedom fighters. Take careful note of that.

There are a few problems with the translation, many with copy editing, and a plethora with the computer lay out, including some text missing and incorrectly broken up paragraphs. But that is immaterial, for the information assembled by Teofil Lachowicz is well worth such inconveniences.

Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
Washington, DC, 11 November 2011
http://www.iwp.edu

Trouble in the heart of Europe: Prof. Marek Chodakiewicz comments

Transitioning out of communism to democracy was never easy in Central and Eastern Europe. In many ways, the process is still incomplete, facing many obstacles and, sometimes, also suffering setbacks.

One of these was the recent firing of the director of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes–the Czech Republic’s prime body for documenting and prosecuting German and communist crimes–under the pressure of post-communists and their liberal and socialist allies.

The effort to sweep communist atrocities and inequities under the rug, which drives these post-communist forces, is described by Prof. Marek Jan Chodakiewicz in his latest article for the Selous Foundation for Public Policy Research (SFPPR) News & Analysis section.