Soviet agents of influence–in the United States in general, and in the Roosevelt administration in particular–in the context of Yalta were the topic of Dr. Chodakiewicz’s lecture on Wednesday, January 16, during which he discussed his review of M. Stanton Evans’ and Herbert Romerstein’sStalin’s Secret Agents: The Subversion of Roosevelt’s Government (New York: Threshold Editions, a division of Simon & Shuster, Inc., 2012).
The presentation is part of an ongoing series of lectures on the Intermarium, and for good reason. After all, the communist moles surrounding FDR facilitated the Sovietization of Central and Eastern Europe following the Second World War, Dr. Chodakiewicz argued. Furthermore, their influence on American policy throughout the Cold War remains unappreciated and underestimated.
In more recent times, following the implosion of the Soviet Empire, the threat of a “Yalta II” is on the minds of many Central and Eastern Europeans. This has been particularly true during the last several years as post-Soviet Russia’s power and ambition has waxed under Putin and America’s interest in and commitment to the Intermarium has waned under Obama, stated Dr. Chodakiewicz. In part, Obama’s “reset” policy-based on stronger ties with Moscow at the expense of the former “captive nations” (Poles, Ukrainians, Balts, Georgians, etc.)-is rooted in some historic features of American foreign policy, including: pragmatism, isolationism, and a preference for dealing with fewer strong partners rather than many weaker ones. Further, in the post-cultural-revolution context, the liberal administration believes naively that the U.S. can placate unfriendly governments by demonstrating “good will” in the form of abandoning allies. Yet, as the case of Yalta I shows, aggressive regimes generally interpret such far-reaching concessions as weakness and cues to push for more.
Dr. Chodakiewicz’s review of Evans’ and Romerstein’s book was published on the website of the Selous Foundation for Public Policy Research (SFPPR).