Category Archives: News

Former Kosciuszko Chair intern interviewed on feminism by Polish weekly

Ms. Karolina Dobrowolska, a former intern of the Kościuszko Chair of Polish Studies (Fall 2013), was justinterviewed by the Polish Catholic weekly, Gość Niedzielny [The Sunday Guest]. Ms. Dobrowolska — who is a graduate of the University of Warsaw and an attorney at the “Ordo Iuris” Legal Institute — has co-organized, along with the female colleagues, a protest against the ratification of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence.

The reason behind this opposition is, as Ms. Dobrowolska explains, the highly-misleading name of the document which sounds very noble but is, in fact, a radical feminist (“genderist”) assault on the traditional family and gender roles. The primary claim of the “genderist” post-modernists — that gender is nothing more than a “social construct,” and therefore relative and subjective — is clearly a recipe for subverting the primary social unit that is the family. The resulting moral chaos, Ms. Dobrowolska argues, will render atomized and confused individuals easier to indoctrinate and manipulate.

She also challenged the assertions of feminists and other progressives who portray Poland as a land of widespread domestic violence and physical abuse of women. The reality, the young attorney points out, is that “according to the research done by the EU Agency of Basic Rights in the spring of 2014, violence against women in Poland is at a level of 19 percent, whereas in Denmark, where feminists dominate and have implemented measures based on the Convention, it is at 52 percent.”

The factor mitigating against domestic violence targeting women in Poland is the nation’s culture. The former KC intern continues: “Poland is a Catholic country with a highly-developed cult of the Virgin Mary, which, along with literary traditions evolving for centuries, has generated an atmosphere of respect for women.”

Dr. Chodakiewicz’s censored interview on Ukraine and Russia

On February 15, Dr. Marek Chodakiewicz was interviewed by a DC-based reporter for the English-language Russian website Sputnik News on the current Russo-Ukrainian crisis. In the end, it never made the cut, and Sputnik News decided not to publish the interview. No doubt, the Kremlin sees things much differently than Dr. Chodakiewicz, but, for the sake of media freedom, we are publishing the interview below.

Sputnik News: I was hoping to get your comments regarding a Minsk declaration, which was agreed upon during the so-called Normandy format meeting on Ukrainian reconciliation on Thursday. The document stipulates ceasefire at 12:00 a.m. local time on February 15 (February 14, 22:00 GMT), and withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the existing contact line for the Ukrainian army, and from the line agreed on last September for the militia.

How likely is it that the parties will follow through with this agreement? One of the conditions for Kiev to regain control over the border with Russia is the implementation of constitutional reforms in Ukraine, according to the Minsk declaration. Will Kiev really implement constitutional reforms and give more rights to the regions?

MJC: I will first answer both questions above. Everything mostly depends on the Kremlin. If Moscow orders the separatists to stand down, most of them will. A few may bristle, but they’ll also follow suit. Kyiv barely holds its own. It should wish for a freeze in fighting, if for tactical reasons only. Whereas for Russia the choice is simple, for Ukraine any move is fraught with multilayered problems. Of course, the government in Kyiv cannot countenance giving up any Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. It would then stop being a Ukrainian government. However, there are pragmatists in the government who may want to consider the federal option as a face saving device.  Nominally, a federated Ukraine would remain a single state. Practically, however, rebel-occupied areas would exercise autonomy and affiliate very closely with Russia. So Ukraine would become a de facto confederation of regions. Instead of a single unrecognized state of Transnistria, we would have a bevy of them, stretching along the current eastern border and the northern shore of the Black Sea. And Russia would expand unimpeded at a glacial pace, except in times of periodic crisis when history would accelerate for the Kremlin.

This scenario has already been tried in history. It was the case with the Cossack Rebellion of 1648. First, the Cossacks, especially their leaders, who were Polish nobles usually of Ruthenian roots and mostly Orthodox faith, considered themselves faithful servants or the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania, objecting “only” to the Parliament (Sejm) and the local magnates (most of them Ruthenians by ethnicity, and freshly converted to Roman Catholicism).   Then, the Cossacks asserted a de facto autonomy. They entered into direct relations with the Ottoman Porte and the Crimean Khan, and later with the Muscovites. They lacked the wherewithal to master this dynamic relationship; their attempts to reconcile with the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian Commonwealth came to naught. And they were ultimately gobbled up by Moscow.

And, in the long run, that is the most likely scenario for Ukraine, whether it adheres to the Minsk accords or not.

The Minsk document adopted by the leaders of Ukraine, Germany, Russia, and France on Thursday calls for an «all-for-all» prisoner swap within five days after troops are pulled back in the eastern regions of Ukraine.

In your opinion, can this be carried through?

MJC: If there is political will in the Kremlin, it can be done. Thank God there is not enough bitterness yet among the fighters to prevent an “all for all” prisoner swap. However, even with good will in Moscow and Kyiv, there may be snags in the timetable. Five days is an awfully short time. Yet, it may be exactly what the doctors ordered: a leap of faith. The government forces withdraw without paying attention to what the other side is doing, and vice versa. It will have to be a huge leap of faith.

How would you evaluate the possibility of direct talks between Kiev and Eastern Ukraine?

MJC: They are slim, except on technical issues. Please remember that, although in a way brothers are fighting against brothers here, it is not a classical civil war because the center of the rebel command is in a foreign country: Russia. And we are not talking about a rebel eastern Ukrainian government in exile, we are talking about the master of the Kremlin: Vladimir Putin. He directs the battle. He is the commander-in-chief of the rebel forces.

What is the future of Russia-Ukraine military contacts?

MJC: I wish I could say peaceful. At both the tactical and strategic levels, the Russians play a crucial part in the unfolding drama. When they stop, peace shall prevail.

Should the administration reconsider arming Ukraine?

MJC: Sure. It is not often that a people want to defend themselves from an aggression from a foreign country. Usually, everyone expects the US to pull one’s chestnuts out of the fire.

Will US training program for the Ukrainian National Guard be effective, is it enough to change situation on the ground?

MJC: Tactical training will be effective. It will definitely boost the morale of the Ukrainian troops. It won’t change the situation on the ground, but, instead, it is a show of solidarity on the part of the White House. Thus it is a diplomatic tool to indicate to Russia that we are serious about helping Ukraine. I am afraid, however, that if it is not followed up with arms, it will be too little and too late.

Dr. Chodakiewicz lectures about Katyn at the Polish Museum of America

Katyn Truth RemembranceOn Sunday, February 8, Dr. Marek Chodakiewicz delivered an address at the Polish Museum of America in Chicago during the opening of the exhibition “Katyn: Truth and Remembrance.” The following is a summary of Dr. Chodakiewicz’s remarks.

The Katyn Forest Massacre, during which the Soviet NKVD killed 26,000 Polish officers and other members of Poland’s elite, is a symbol. First, it is a symbol of the pathology of twentieth-century totalitarianism with all its mass murder, deception, and willful blindness. Secondly, it is a symbol of martyrology and the extermination of the flower of Poland’s elite. A people without an elite struggle to remain a conscious nation but, instead, turn into passive “ethnographic material.”

Why should we remember Katyn? It is humans – not beasts – who remember and honor their dead. The Poles were not allowed properly to bury and mourn the victims of Katyn for half a century. Officially, they were not allowed to remember them. The natural or divine law was thus violated by positive or man-made law, in this case Soviet communist “law” (show trials, executions, terror, and censorship).

To remember is to know. Knowledge is indispensable to make informed decisions, and we learn from experience. We pass on knowledge from generation to the next. That is why tyrants have always attempted to kill memory, as did king Creon of Thebes in Sophocles’ Antigone. The heroine, who buried her brother’s body, in spite of Creon’s edict banning it, was reproached by the tyrant, who asked why she dared to disobey his laws. Antigone answered:

Yes, for it was not Zeus who gave them forth,
Nor Justice, dwelling with the Gods below,
Who traced these laws for all the sons of men;
Nor did I deem thy edicts strong enough,
Coming from mortal man, to set at nought
The unwritten laws of God that know not change.
They are not of to-day nor yesterday,
But live for ever, nor can man assign
When first they sprang to being. Not through fear
Of any man’s resolve was I prepared
Before the Gods to bear the penalty
Of sinning against these. That I should die
I knew, (how should I not?) though thy decree
Had never spoken. And, before my time
If I should die, I reckon this a gain;
For whoso lives, as I, in many woes,
How can it be but death shall bring him gain?
And so for me to bear this doom of thine
Has nothing painful. But, if I had left
My mother’s son unburied on his death,
I should have given them pain. But as things are,
Pain I feel none. And should I seem to thee
To have done a foolish deed, ‘tis simply this,-
I bear the charge of folly from a fool.

What do the totalitarians want to remember? Nothing! The Maoist cannibal, Joseph Kabila of the Congo, killed old people specifically because they shaped the young. In a pre-literate society it was a winning formula. After thirty years, he was able to capture power thanks to the amnesia he thus imposed on the masses.

What do we know? Katyn is just the tip of the iceberg. The Bolshevik mass-murder machine began operating as soon as the communists seized power in Russia in 1917. First, they targeted the Polish nobility of the eastern borderlands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, followed by the intelligentsia, priests, social activists, and even boy and girl scouts. Then, during the so-called “liberal” 1920s in the USSR, the Bolshevik regime combated the Catholic Church and its lay followers. In 1929 – 1933, the Poles, and especially the petty nobility of the Minsk and Kyiv areas, was overrepresented among the victims of Stalin’s collectivization and finished-off during the “dekulakization” operation in 1935. As Dr. Tomasz Sommer has demonstrated in his book, the greatest peacetime genocide of the interwar period, the “Anti-Polish Operation” of the NKVD, was ordered by Stalin and the Politburo and lasted from August 1937 until November 1938. The Soviet chekists targeted ethnic Poles as alleged “spies” and even searched for Polish-sounding names in the phone books to fulfill the plan of extermination. As a result, up to 250,000 Soviet Poles – usually men between the ages of 16 and 65 – perished.

The deportations of Poles to Siberia and mass executions after 1939, including Katyn, were the logical continuation of this orgy of totalitarian madness. The postwar communist terror was its final chapter. Thus, for example, in August of 1945, during the Augustów Dragnet, the NKVD rounded up thousands of suspected Polish resistance fighters and killed many of them. The Poles continued to be the enemy nation. In fact, twice the number of NKVD regiments were stationed in the Soviet-occupied rump Poland after the war than were in the USSR’s occupation zone in East Germany.

The objective of all this was to destroy the Polish Nation via the extermination of the conscious broadly-understood elite! The people would become mere ethnographic material, like putty in the hands of the communist social engineers, not a nation.

Stalin and the Politburo considered Poland enemy number one long after it was warranted on the account of the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1919-1921. Why? Because the Poles were able to project a universalistic message, the power of the Commonwealth, to organize the Intermarium in a just and decent way. And this the successors of the communists, the Soviets, the successors to the empire of the Tsars, wanted to obliterate.

Yet, we did not forget. We remember. And now the whole world knows, ironically because of the Smolensk Presidential Plane Crash. All wires and dispatches in 2010 mentioned Katyn. When President Lech Kaczyński was buried at the Wawel Cathedral, the funeral was not only his own, but also (finally) a collective official one for the victims of Katyn. In the US Army, the rule is to “leave no man behind.” The same principle is honored by the Polish military and the Polish nation. To remember is not to leave behind.

Now that we know about Katyn, we can move forward. Nevertheless, historians and other concerned individuals must remain in the rear and resolve a few more issues. First, we must finally obtain the Belarussian Katyn List. Secondly, we must thoroughly research the anti-Polish operation of the NKVD (1937-1938). What we have so far is only an introduction to further research. Third, we must delve into the anti-Polish aspects of the Soviet democide of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Fourth, we must unearth the tragic fate of the Poles during the revolution and civil war in Russia (1917 – 1921). Fifth, we must zero in on Communist crimes after 1945. We owe it to the victims to remember.

Prof. Chodakiewicz discusses Russian military and influence operations at US Army Europe Senior Leaders Forum

Photo by US Army IWP’s Professor Marek Jan Chodakiewicz was invited to speak at the US Army Europe Senior Leaders Forum which took place from January 12-14, 2015 in Wiesbaden, Germany on the topic of “Strong Europe.” There were several panels held, in which panelists delivered general remarks and answered analytic questions.  Prof. Chodakiewicz was one of the only non-government experts to participate.

On January 13, he gave remarks at a panel entitled “Russian Military Modernization, Influence Operations, and Russian Operational Art from Georgia, ZAPAD-13, to Ukraine and Donbas.” Other panelists included high level intelligence officers, a senior civilian defense specialist, and a diplomat.

The leadership conference included NATO allies: Germans, Spanish, Belgians, British, and others.  The bulk of the audience consisted of brigade and some regiment commanders, generals, State Department officials, and DoD representatives.  The audience also included senior officers and NCOs, including from the units slated to be deployed to Ukraine.

A version of Dr. Chodakiewicz’s comments appear below.

Muscovite Continuity:
An Integrated Strategy and Counterintelligence Operation

In the past few years, the Kremlin has brought forth a dazzling array of its tools of statecraft, combining political warfare, public diplomacy, active measures, disinformation, propaganda, covert actions, and military power, including conventional and guerrilla operations. In a word, President Vladimir Putin predictably has pursued power to restore the empire. Moscow has deployed methods on which it has relied from times immemorial. We deal here with continuity rather than discontinuity. Thus, the Kremlin’s moves could be anticipated. This is plain, despite the shocking surprise of some of the Western observers who failed to predict Russia’s expansion and, consequently, their flawed attempts to understand the phenomena at play. For example, some of them discovered the alleged novelty of “hybrid warfare.” Yet, what we have seen from Georgia to Ukraine is a traditional, irregular fighting method which has adopted itself to new circumstances by incorporating new technologies.

As I argued in my Intermarium, history undergirds Putin’s moves, his imperial aim remains immutable; and his tools of statecraft are fixed. Within this context, let us look at Moscow’s soft power, strategic messaging, propaganda narrative, military build-up, and new technologies, including cyber and social media capabilities. We shall also briefly consider the relationship between Russia’s economic resources and will to power, as well as the capacity of Western sanctions to diminish both.

I. The Context

The context allowing us to understand Russia requires remembering the factors which have continued to inform Russian conduct for several hundreds of years. First, the Russian Federation is a despotic and patrimonial polity with its Byzantine caesaro-papism (no division between church and state and, hence, no sphere of freedom) descending from the Mongol-controlled Duchy of Moscow and its successors: the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Second, another thread of continuity stems from the fact that the Russian Federation is a product of the transformation of Communism into post-Communism, and not liberal democracy. The transformation ensured that the institutions and the personnel of the totalitarian state have survived to haunt their subjects and the rest of the world into the 21st century. This is the deeper meaning of Putin’s famous dictum, “once a Chekist, always a Chekist.”  Third, continuity in the Russian Federation pertains further to the modus operandi of the regime. Marxist-Leninist dialectics allow the Kremlin to be very flexible and pragmatic, amoral, and relativistic. No longer a millenarian ideology, which masked as “science,” promising paradise on earth by following a self-anointed vanguard of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism serves the post-Communist successors of the vanguard as a handy tool to maintain themselves in power by deftly exercising control over the captive Russian population.

II. The Aim

What is the aim of the Russian post-Communist regime? It wants to maintain Putin and his team in power. It endeavors to restore the empire in three areas. Its first target is the so-called “near abroad” (the newly liberated nations of the old USSR); next on the list are the former Warsaw Pact countries; and, finally, there follows whatever else the logic of imperial expansion dictates. In a way, the sky is always the theoretical limit, but the resources, will, and means inevitably tend to serve as a check on the imperial appetites. Restoring the empire means anything between incorporation and satellitezation. This is accomplished through a variety of means — including cultural and economic influence, for example, the much feared energy weapon vis-à-vis the European Union — deployed shrewdly to undermine and even disintegrate the Western Alliance, NATO in particular.

III. The Tools

What are the tools? Moscow deploys the following resources:

  1. Energy revenues and shady business deals. The latter usually involve raw materials and minerals. They function in a world of murky financial transactions involving a multitude of related companies acquired in the past twenty-odd years by post-Soviet nationals, mostly the oligarchs, with often rumored criminal underworld ties, whose actions are increasingly coordinated with the Russian state.
  2. Integrated strategy
  • Active measures (all tricks short of violence, including spies and agents of influence, e.g., the activities of the Anna Chapman group in New York; the Snowden operation)
  • Counterintelligence and “wet affairs” (e.g., the Alexander Litvinienko assassination, kidnapping of an Estonian intelligence officer from his country into Russia)
  • Swaggering (including Russia’s antics in the Arctic and airspace violation through overflights in the US, Canada, the Baltics, and Scandinavia, as well as coastal water penetration via submarines, as has been experienced lately by Sweden [BBC, 11 December 2014])
  • Sheer force (war against Georgia in 2008, invasion of Crimea in 2014)
  • The will to deploy all of the above

IV. Questions and problems

  1. What are Russia’s main sources of soft power?
  • Iron will of the leader and his team
  • Popular resentment of the West among the post-Soviet Russian people
  • Western naiveté and gullibility

1. Do Russian leaders view soft power the same way that Western leaders do? The short answer is an emphatic “No!” A long response follows:

  • True, both Western and Russian leaders recognize soft power as a tool of statecraft, but that’s where similarities end.
  • For Western leaders, the Americans in particular, “soft power” is a zinger, a sound bite, a gimmick to distinguish oneself from the allegedly troglodyte past of the previous administration. Soft power should serve to make things nice, to show that the Americans are also from Venus. At best, in the West, soft power is a stand-alone phenomenon uncoordinated with other endeavors of exercising political will.
  • The Kremlin regards soft power as just one tool in a vast arsenal of statecraft. In coordination with other tools of power, it is used to dominate, to intimidate, and to achieve strategic objectives.

3. How does Russia use social media or cyber operations to promote its strategic message?

It does so by deploying new technologies to project time-worn propaganda messages, in a protracted campaign dubbed by Russian dissidents as the “weaponization of information,” by:

a. Waging cyberwar or cyberattacks to:

b. Using social media to:

  • Influence
  • Woo
  • Smear
  • Convince
  • Disinform
  • Sway
  • Manipulate

c. As far as new cybertechnologies, the Kremlin’s methods include deploying:

  • Fake websites (including on Facebook, e.g. to spread disinformation about the war in eastern Ukraine or its particular aspects, like the downing of the Malaysian Air passenger plane in July 2014)
  • “Doctoring” Wikipedia pages
  • Fake virtual think tanks (e.g., Center for Eurasian Strategic Intelligence, see, 15 December 2014)
  • Propaganda tweets and hubs (e.g., is set up to allow foreigners to apologize to Putin for Western “aggression” in Ukraine; the website is available in 19 languages; or so-called “source-laundry assets,” news websites, legitimizing the Kremlin’s propaganda spin in one accessible place for local and foreign media to pick it up)
  • Trolls on the internet (various fora, and comment sections of on-line newspapers)
  • Hackers and destruction, or at least crippling, of web news sources deemed hostile to the Kremlin
  • Setting up new and improved English language news media, e.g., Russia Today (RT), Sputnik News (the latter projected to employ from 30 to 100 people in each of its 130 studios in 34 countries, including 100 staff in Kyiv, propagandizing in 30 languages, see Guardian, 6 January 2015)
  • Promoting,  through the Kremlin’s media empire, of the Western and “near abroad” useful idiots, agents of influence, and others parroting Moscow’s propaganda line, who otherwise would linger in obscurity (e.g., an erstwhile populist Samoobrona [Self-Defense] activist, Mateusz Piskorski, in Poland, or the leaders of a radical nationalist miniscule group, Falanga; a bevy of similar non-entities and pro-Russian extremists elsewhere in Europe; the pseudo-Atlanticists in Germany, thus ensuring that the Kremlin’s message spreads and the unity of the West suffers, e.g.,, 11 December 2014,
  • Seemingly legitimate Russian and allied news media patiently and consistently repeating Soviet-vintage propaganda to control the narrative which, in turn infects the Western media echo chamber (e.g., one of the most popular is the canard that the Red Army “liberated” Poland in 1945, completely ignoring that liberation means bringing freedom, and Stalin merely pushed out and replaced Hitler as a new occupier. How could anyone be liberated by Stalin?)

4. What are the most salient features and themes of the Kremlin’s propaganda offensive?

They include:

a. An endeavor to occupy high moral ground, through:

  • Waging a peace offensive against the West’s defending itself (e.g., vs. deploying US missiles in Romania, see TASS, 17 December 2014)
  • Condemning violence (e.g., vs. torture by the CIA, see TASS, 17 December 2014)
  • Exposing and branding “fascism” and “the fascists” (e.g., the new government of Ukraine and, in particular, its voluntary militias)
  • Defense of Christian civilization (e.g., against “gay propaganda”)

b. An effort to purvey disinformation and sow mistrust to undermine NATO and other allies of the United States

  • The Snowden affair (which has become an intelligence and counterintelligence operation by Moscow, see
  • Wikileaks (which should now be considered primarily as a platform for foreign intelligence influence operations rather than merely a cyber anarcho-hactivist performance art)
  • The Western paleo-conservative and libertarian duping (which afflicts Pat Buchanan and Ron Paul followers who see Vladimir Putin either as a champion of traditional values or a victim of Western aggression into “his” sphere of influence; e.g.,

5. How do Russia’s domestic strategic messages differ from its foreign messages?

The target audiences are differentiated according to a sophisticated variety of criteria. Sometimes propaganda messages overlap; however, oftentimes the accents on various propaganda features are distributed differently based on whether they are intended for domestic consumption or for foreign use. Propaganda for domestic use can sound quite hysterical. In the “near abroad” it can be very virulent, in particular in Ukraine. For example, in Kharkiv the pro-Russian underground stuffed mailboxes of Ukrainian activists, including those employed by NGOs, with a Christmas message that read: “We’ll get every single one of you Nazi scum,” virtually an exact replica of letters addressed to Nazi collaborators during the Second World War by Communist guerrillas (see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8 January 2015, The regime often practices the art of allusion that is quite readable at home, and quite obscure abroad, in the West in particular.

a. Domestic consumption:

  • The Kremlin narrates its aggression in Ukraine, the Baltics, and Caucasus as if Russia were fighting the Second World War all over again. It includes attacking its opponents in the “near abroad” as “the fascists,” while assistance to the rebels and Russian minorities is dubbed “fraternal assistance,” which — at the same time — the government denies to be rendering. The assault on the near abroad (nearly identical for both foreign and domestic reception) is pregnant with the symbolism of the Second World War, which is projected in a much more emotional manner for the domestic consumer.
  • Moscow claims (both for domestic and foreign audiences) to be defending Jews in Ukraine from fascists and anti-Semites. However, simultaneously, it blames the “oligarchs” — a by-word for “the Jews” — as having taken over in Ukraine, a cryptic message that is easily read by Russia’s domestic audience.
  • The Russian Federation pursues a pro-active policy of support for the Russian minority (or, rather, more accurately, post-Soviet Russian speakers) residing outside of the state’s boundaries, primarily in the near abroad (but also elsewhere in the diaspora, e.g. Cyprus). The concern for these “Russians” is expressed in nationalistic, cultural, and religious terms. They are “fellow Russians,” “our [(post) Soviet] people,” and Christian Orthodox. The existence of large Russian-speaking former post-colonial remnants is the main tool of Moscow’s influence in the “near abroad.” The Kremlin meddles in the affairs of foreign countries by invoking “human rights” in defense of the allegedly “oppressed” Russian minority, and additionally boosts its strength by providing economic and diplomatic assistance, which translate mainly into cultural continuity with the Soviet times and continuous alienation from mainstream cultures through resistance to assimilation. The Russian minority is the main tool of Russian imperialism. This is not only evident in Ukraine, but in the Baltics in particular.
  • Putin singles out the Poles as the greatest threat and the main troublemakers (e.g, the Poles, at the behest of the US, allegedly trained the Kyiv Maidan fighters, and “Polish mercenaries” allegedly battle the rebels in the Donbas). Historically, the Poles were the main rivals of the Muscovites in the struggle to dominate of the Intermarium, the land between the Black and Baltic seas, and the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1919 – 1921 was the only time in history that the Red Army was defeated in the field. Hence, at the symbolic level, the Russian President replaced the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution commemoration with a holiday celebrating the termination of the occupation of Moscow by the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania-Ruthenia in 1612. All this is absolutely obvious at home in Russia, and uniformly ignored in the West. The Kremlin hastens not to explicate this complicated issue beyond the post-Soviet zone.
  • The chief successor state to the USSR loudly proclaims its unity of purpose with Orthodox (Russian) Christian faith. It vows to uphold it as Russia’s true faith, while accommodating as junior confessions Judaism and Islam. Protestant Christianity is treated as a sect, and Catholicism regarded as “a Polish religion,” and dangerous theological and political competition.

b. Narratives for foreign consumption:

  • Russia stands for freedom and protects dissidents in fear of persecution in the  West (Snowden)
  • Russia supports Christian civilization against the West’s counterculture, in particular “gay propaganda.”
  • The Euro-Maidan Rising was a US-engineered coup
  • War in Ukraine is about defeating fascism; the pro-Russian rebels are anti-fascists; the Ukrainians are fascists.
  • Russia is not supporting the rebels in eastern Ukraine; the foreign fighters there are uniformly volunteers.
  • Ukrainians commit mass atrocities (and Russian propaganda outlets duly produce pictures from the Chechen wars which they peddle as Kyiv’s murderous actions; similarly, fake witnesses appear to testify about alleged Ukrainian atrocities, including, e.g., a ubiquitous woman who – under different guises and multiple identities – swears to have participated in at least a dozen affairs simultaneously, see, 8 January 2015)
  • Russia and Russian-backed rebels are a pro-Jewish force for they protect Jews from “the fascists” (this is perhaps the most blatant way to pander to the Western media and public)
  • Moscow protects the “human rights” of minorities (without stressing the Kremlin’s chief, if not sole interest in the Russians)

6. Do Russians believe their government’s strategic message? Are they genuinely aggrieved and threatened by the West? 

Yes, most of them do. They perceive the West as having destroyed their beloved USSR and as invading “their” space via NATO expansion, free trade, and cultural imperialism (McDonald’s, rock music, drugs, AIDS, and subversive ideologies, including feminism, gay liberation, and sexual revolution). Despite their own atheism or agnosticism, which they have dubbed as “cultural Christian Orthodoxy,” they condemn the West as “godless” and irreverent on the account of the dominant counter-cultural paradigm of the 1960s in the mainstream of the United States and its allies.

7. What are the economic limits on Russia’s ability to influence its near abroad? What about Europe?

Short of a collapse on a scale experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there are practically no limits. There is only the will of Putin and his team. The old adage that the Russians will “eat grass,” if that is what it takes to defeat the West, still applies.

8. What is the goal of Russia’s military modernization and how might it be set back by recent economic sanctions?

The goal is restoring the empire. It is to put the Russian military back on par with America’s. As far as the threat to Russia’s modernization through Western sanctions, it depends how serious the United States, the European Union, and Japan are about economic warfare. It seems that they are not too serious since they appear to want to chastise gently the post-Soviets, rather than cripple and even less destroy them. Serious economic sanctions would mean a serious setback to Russia’s military modernization campaign, but only in a long run. In the short run, Moscow has either invented or, more often, stolen enough technologies and generated enough revenue to accomplish at least some of its plans to catch up with the US. Serious sanctions — denial of credit, markets, and new technologies – would ensure that the accomplishments would not be sustainable in the long run.

9. What are Russia’s biggest achievements to date in military modernization?

The greatest accomplishments are maintaining world-class nuclear forces (as the Kremlin like to brag, the Russian Federation is the only nation that can destroy the United States for it inherited the USSR’s nuclear capabilities) and fielding fearsome special forces, as well as resurrecting the navy, its submarine component in particular. Beyond that Russia’s military is inferior and often corrupt, suffering poor morale among regular troops (which is plagued by high suicide rates and endemic hazing of the recruits). The so-called revolution in military affairs has impacted only the elite branches of the military, while neglecting most others.

10. What is the Russian military strategy for the next 3 to 5 years?

In general, it is to regain whatever it lost following the implosion of the USSR. In particular, the military is set to slowly cannibalize the “near abroad” through active measures and special operations waiting for an opportunity to strike and expand. It aims to prevent any of the “near abroad” from either joining the West or succumbing to the Caliphatists (Islamists).

11. How is Russia most likely to implement Hybrid Warfare and what is most challenging for a conventional force in countering this form of war?

“Hybrid Warfare” is a misnomer suggesting a new phenomenon, when it is a traditional Russian fighting method. It is a fancy name for a combined tactic of irregular operations (guerrilla war, asymmetric actions, commando tactics, etc.) that the upstart Muscovities learned from the nomadic Mongols from the 13th century onward. The only difference is that the Kremlin incorporated new technologies, including cyber operations, to facilitate their ongoing success. Irregular operations misnamed “Hybrid Warfare” are nothing new. The greatest challenge is to recognize them for what they are and counter them with the same and/or massive civil disobedience. Their latest Crimean and eastern Ukrainian avatar concerned the deployment of the following traditional components:

  • “Tin cans” (konservy), or military intelligence officers who galvanized, organized, and led the rebellion
  • “Green people” (Russian special forces infiltrators) who provided the backbone for rebel operations
  • Volunteers, real and imagined (both locals and outsiders)

12. What has Russia not yet achieved in terms of military modernization?

It has not achieved a comprehensive revolution in military affairs. It has not empowered its NCO corps because that would undermine the pathological culture of denying and withholding initiative and responsibility at the tactical level. Finally, it has not yet stolen the newest technology to integrate fully all its military branches.

13. How do Russia’s use of information operations and strategic messaging benefit military operations?

Generally, information operations and strategic messaging directed at the West ensure that the responses by the United States and its allies are confused, feeble, and delayed, if any. At the tactical level, information operations and strategic messaging paved the way for a virtually bloodless victory in Crimea. This was a brilliant deception operation which confused and disarmed the defenders. The invaders claimed to have descended upon Crimea to defend the locals against the “fascists” in Kyiv. They avoided the use of violence, whenever possible, instead disarming the Ukrainian forces psychologically by invoking Slavic and post-Soviet “brotherhood,” intimidating through swaggering with an overwhelming force, and bribing many to defect.

14. How could Russia’s strategic messages be most effectively challenged?

This is a piecemeal question. I shall try to answer comprehensively addressing issues beyond strategic messaging to suggest, first, remedies to the current crisis, and, then, strategies to handle the Kremlin consistently.

  • Move NATO nations and their allies beyond debating whether to counter to how to counter Russia’s “weaponization of information,” i.e. its infowars, by drawing from vast Cold War experience, in particular from the 1980s, instead of reinventing the wheel (e.g.,, 8 January 2015).
  • Integrate strategic communications of NATO and its allies, while retaining local flavor of each of the participant crafted to particular challenges.
  • Craft NATO messages pro-actively, anticipating the Kremlin’s moves
  • Provide cultural translation to second tier NATO nations, in particular the Mediterranean countries to help them understand issues at stake and to counter Russian disinformation
  • Carry out the same operation for Third World consumption
  • Create English language multiple media platforms to influence Western public opinion to alarm it to the nature of post-Soviet aggression
  • Produce social media shows on topics of interest to counter Russian propaganda, in particular where it has seeped successfully into the Western public circulation because of the complicity, conscious or unconscious, of the prestige media (e.g., NATO has produced a Youtube video to dispel the Kremlin propaganda canard that western Ukraine consists entirely of fascists, see Financial Times, 7 December 2014)
  • Create a Russian language media platform (TV, radio, internet) to influence the Russian speaking public all over the world: Radio, TV, and Web Liberty (RTVWL). Open its offices in all nations of the post-Soviet zone, in the “near abroad” and Russia itself in particular.
  • Create separate web-based platforms to counter each of Russia’s propaganda narratives (e.g., that there are no Russian troops in eastern Ukraine); make the endeavor interactive; post pictures and crowdsource; get the greatest public involvement possible at all levels.
  • Jam Russian broadcasts in response to jamming Western media activities; respond to Moscow’s blocking of Western web-based platforms by taking down Russian internet infrastructure.
  • Require reciprocity in media access. E.g., if Sputnik News opens an office in DC, then RTVWL must be permitted to set one up in Moscow. If Russia Today (RT) is allowed to broadcast in the United States, broadband and cable access is automatically granted to RTVWL in the Russian Federation.
  • Wage cyberwar against the Kremlin cybertrolls and hackers
  • Launch a public diplomacy program for Russian children; make it a part of educational exchanges. If the Russians want to send neo-Line X “scientists,” they may do so at the pain of expulsion but, more importantly, only if Russian children can be exposed to the American way of life — of course in Middle America as opposed to Manhattan, Los Angles, or San Francisco.
  • If the US really wants peace, it should give a nuclear deterrent to Poland or station a missile defense force there.

If we are willing to learn from history, we shall see that Russia is quite predictable in its moves. Putin simply applies a traditional combination of military power, active measures, propaganda, political warfare, and diplomacy to achieve the reintegration of the empire. However, the West has an enormous technological and resource advantage. Unfortunately, it lacks unity, focus, and will. In particular, the United States has been incapable of providing leadership as far as resurgent Russia is concerned. The solution is simple: to reverse the course and realize America’s potential to make the world a safer place by countering the Kremlin’s aggression.

Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
Wiesbaden, 13 January 2015

Photo above by the US Army.

Dr. Chodakiewicz’s Intermarium mentioned in Spanish scholarly journal

Intermarium, by Mark ChodakiewiczDr. Marek Jan Chodakiewicz’s Intermarium: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012) has been gaining increasing publicity in the scholarly and policy-analysis worlds since the monograph’s publication.

Quite recently, Intermarium was mentioned by Dr. Dominik Smyrgała, a professor of international relations at the Collegium Civitas in Warsaw (Poland), in the Barcelona-based Spanish-Catalan scholarly historical journal Tiempo Devorado: Revista de Historia Actual (No. 1, December 2014, pp. 28 – 37).

The English-language version of the article, “Intermarium: From the battle of Varna to the war in Ukraine,” can be accessed here.

Prof. Marek Chodakiewicz speaks at Yale APAC conference

Marek Chodakiewicz APAC Conference 2014 800On Sunday, December 7, Dr. Marek Chodakiewicz spoke at the American Polish Advisory Council’s conference on “Poland’s Emerging Role in Shaping Global Security & the US-Polish Partnership” at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut.

During the conference, Dr. Chodakiewicz, who currently holds the Kościuszko Chair of Polish Studies at IWP, participated in a panel discussion on panel on “25 Years of Democracy in Poland and the US-Polish Partnership: Military Cooperation, Trade, and Common Objectives.”  Other speakers at the conference included Honorable Boguslaw Winid, Poland’s Ambassador to the United Nations, and Jaroslaw Strozyk, Poland’s Defense Attaché in Washington.

An outline of his remarks can be found below.

Photo courtesy of the American Polish Advisory Council.  


Poland’s Integrated Strategy:
An Outline

Poland needs integrated strategy, one that encompasses many tools of statecraft. However, to play at the global scale, one must have the means to do so. Poland does not. It should acquire them. Meanwhile, it should either lay low and reform or make popular noises at the international level, in other words, bluff, and reform.

Poland can try to go it alone, which is unadvisable, or seek an alliance for security. At the moment it has NATO. However, the US is confused and Western Europe unwilling to step up to the task of defending NATO member states in the post-Soviet zone. “Leading from behind” will continue until a regime change in Washington, but a new administration, after, 2016, may or may not be willing to provide leadership for the alliance.

Meanwhile, despite America’s malaise, Poland needs to reform internally to be able to defend itself. The following should be done:

  • Favor an economic system with low taxes, few regulation, and even fewer government bureaucrats; avoid EU regulations like the plague or learn to overcome them.
  • Support a social system that encourages high birth rates and love of country.
  • Relax gun laws.
  • Encourage grass roots self-defense forces, starting with gun and rifle clubs (bractwa kurkowe).
  • Foster paramilitary activities involving girl and boy scouts and other youthful volunteers.
  • Set up territorial defense from above based upon the Swiss model.
  • Establish throughout the nation a multitude of state arsenals with small arms and individual, portable defense systems, including anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. They are more efficient and economically feasible than expensive weapons systems they are designed to destroy like planes, helicopters, tanks, and armored vehicles.
  • Train both paramilitaries and territorial defense soldiers both male and female.
  • Re-institute a two track draft — for national defense or for national service (e.g., for hospital or school service).
  • Assemble a small professional elite armed forces, including special forces.
  • De-Communize and de-Sovietize the current brass. No post-Communist mentality permitted.
  • Procure defensive nuclear weapons as deterrent: first step, of course, would be to acquire a nuclear reactor, which would also benefit Poland’s energy sector.

Meanwhile, the Polonia should put its money where its mouth is. Support pro-Polish and Polonian initiatives. Be proud and strong.  Lobby both in DC and in Warsaw. Pressure the Polish government to make Poland into a venue into the EU for American interests, including to institute affirmative action for Polish American businessmen.

Peace can only come through strength.

Dr. Chodakiewicz co-edits new document collection on the Polish underground

NarodoweDr. Marek Chodakiewicz – along with Dr. Wojciech J. Muszyński and Leszek Żebrowski – have just published a document anthology, which they compiled and co-edited, on the Polish underground during the Second World War.

Entitled Narodowe Siły Zbrojne: Dokumenty, 1942 – 1944 [The National Armed Forces: Documents] (Lublin: Fundacja im. Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2014), the collection is the first volume of a trilogy of documents on Poland’s anti-Nazi, anti-Soviet armed resistance. Most of the files – originally generated by the High Command of the National Armed Forces (NSZ) – and were locked way for more than six decades.  They were finally rediscovered in 2008 and are now available for scholars and researchers in a convenient three-volume collection.

Please click here for more information.